

Message Text

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PAGE 01 ANKARA 04874 01 OF 02 030851Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----008502 030854Z /11

O R 030740Z JUL 78
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2470
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSION USBERLIN
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USNATO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
USDOCOSOUTH
AMCONSUL ADANA
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMCONSUL IZMIR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 4874

EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE.

E.O. 11652 GDS
TAGS: PEPR, PARM, SALT, TU, US, UR
SUBJ: ECEVIT DEBRIEFING ON HIS SOVIET TRIP

REF: (A) MOSCOW 15185, (B) MOSCOW 15187

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1. SUMMARY: PRIMIN ECEVIT CALLED ME IN SATURDAY
EVENING, JULY 1, TO PROVIDE PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS OF HIS
RECENT TRIP TO MOSCOW. FONMIN OKCUN AND MFA SEC GEN
ELEKDAG SAT IN. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY DILLON AND PCK.
MUCH OF WHAT HE SAID HAS ALREADY BEEN PASSED ON TO US IN
MORE DETAIL BY THE TURKISH EMBASSY IN MOSCOW (REFTELS),
BUT HE LAID PARTICULAR STRESS ON HIS DISCUSSION OF A CARTER-

BREZHNEV SUMMIT, THE POSITIVE SOVIET ATTITUDE ON CYPRUS, AND HIS VIEWS ON THE COMPLEMENTARITY OF THE SOVIET AND TURKISH ECONOMIES. I RECOMMEND THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO A MESSAGE CONGRATULATING ECEVIT ON HIS STATESMANLIKE PERFORMANCE IN MOSCOW. EMBARGO-RELATED ASPECTS OF OUR CONVERSATION ARE REPORTED SEPTEL. END SUMMARY.

2. ECEVIT WAS IMPRESSED THAT THE SOVIETS EXPRESSED NO DESIRE TO SEE TURKEY OUT OF NATO OR FOR ANY RELAXATION IN TURKEY'S TIES WITH ITS ALLIES, INCLUDING THE US. HE THOUGHT THE SOVIETS SEEMED SINCERE IN THEIR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT TURKEY'S POSITION WITHIN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE AND IN THEIR READINESS TO WORK TOWARD BETTER RELATIONS WITHIN THIS CONTEXT. ECEVIT ALSO THOUGHT THAT THE SOVIETS WERE ANXIOUS NOT TO CAUSE ANY CONCERN IN THE MINDS OF TURKEY'S WESTERN ALLIES WITH RESPECT TO TURKISH-SOVIET RELATIONS, AND HE TOOK THIS TO BE AN INDICATION OF THEIR DESIRE TO MAINTAIN A HEALTHY DEGREE OF BALANCE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

3. AFTER RECOUNTING HOW HE HAD DEFENDED THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S SINCERITY IN ITS APPROACH TO EAST-WEST RELATIONS (REFTEL A), ECEVIT ELABORATED SOMEWHAT ON HIS DISCUSSION WITH BREZHNEV ABOUT A POSSIBLE SUMMIT WITH PRESIDENT CARTER. ECEVIT TOLD BREZHNEV HE WAS CONVINCED THAT PRESIDENT CARTER BELIEVES IN DETENTE, WANTS A SALT TREATY, AND INTENDS TO CONTINUE TO SEARCH FOR WAYS TO LIMIT ARMAMENTS. THE CONFIDENTIAL

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PRESIDENT, HE SAID, SEEMED SATISFIED THAT THE PRESENT SOVIET LEADERSHIP ESSENTIALLY SHARED THESE VIEWS. HE TOLD BREZHNEV THAT IT WAS HIS PERSONAL VIEW THAT THIS WAS A GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE ADVANCES IN THESE AREAS IF BOTH SIDES COULD REMOVE MUTUAL SUSPICIONS. IN THIS REGARD, HE SAID PRESIDENT CARTER HAD EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN A "TOP-LEVEL DIALOGUE", AND THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS HOPEFUL THAT SUCH A DIALOGUE WOULD HAVE A POSITIVE OUTCOME. BREZHNEV APPARENTLY SEEMED VERY INTERESTED IN THIS POINT, BUT LATER RETURNED TO HIS COMPLAINTS REGARDING FREQUENT CHANGES IN THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE.

4. ON THIS SAME THEME, ECEVIT SAID HE HAD LATER RECOUNTED THIS CONVERSATION TO AN INFLUENTIAL ASSOCIATE OF BREZHNEV'S, WHO HAD EXPRESSED GREAT INTEREST. ECEVIT THEN TOOK THE LIBERTY OF DESCRIBING A PRIVATE CONVERSATION HE HAD HAD WITH THE PRESIDENT. HE RELATED HOW PRESIDENT CARTER HAD SAID THAT, IF ONLY BREZHNEV MIGHT COME TO CAMP DAVID WHERE THEY COULD ENGAGE IN A SERIES OF PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS, CARTER WAS HOPEFUL THAT CONCRETE RESULTS COULD EMERGE. APPARENTLY ECEVIT'S SOVIET INTERLOCUTOR THOUGHT THIS AN IMPORTANT POINT, AND ECEVIT AGREED THAT HE MIGHT PASS IT ON

TO BREZHNEV.

5. ON CYPRUS, ECEVIT SAID THAT KOSYGIN HAD TAKEN AN
"UNEXPECTED SATND" IN RESPONSE TO HIS EXPLANATION OF THE
TURKISH POSITION. KOYSGIN HAD SAID THAT A SOUND FEDERAL
STATE IN CYPRUS WAS THE BEST SOLUTION, AND THAT THE BEST

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ACTION SS-25

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 ANKARA 4874

EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

WAY TO ACHINEVE THIS WAS THROUGH THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS.
KOSYGIN REPORTEDLY TOLD HIM THAT "AS LONG AS YOU AGREE AMONG
YOURSELVES", NO ONE ELSE SHOULD BE INVOLVED. KOSYGIN ADDED

THAT, IF NO AGREEMENT WERE REACHED, THE UN MIGHT ASSIST,
BUT THAT THE BEST WAY WAS FOR THE TWO COMMUNITIES TO
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AGREE. ASKED WHETHER GROMYKO SHARED THESE VIEWS, ECEVIT
SAID HE THOUGHT HE DID, BUT EXPRESSED SOME DOUBT THAT THE
SOVIETS WOULD SAY SO IN QUITE SUCH OPEN TERMS FOR FEAR OF
ALIENATING THE GREEK SIDE.

6. THE SOVIETS TOLD ECEVIT THAT KYPRIANOU HAD SENT A MESSAGE
TO THEM ASKING THAT THEY HELP ARRANGE AN ECEVIT-KYPRIANOU
MEETING. BREZHNEV REFERRED TO THIS LETTER, NOTING THAT
KYPRIANOU HAD SUGGESTED THAT THE US AND USSR TAKE JOINT
STEPS REGARDING CYPRUS. BREZHNEV ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT
THE US DID NOT SEEM TO BE IN A HURRY TO EXPEDITE A SOLUTION.
ECEVIT APPARENTLY REPLIED WITH A SMILE THAT, SINCE BOTH THE
US AND THE USSR SEEMED TO BE IN FAVOR OF INTERCOMMUNAL
TALKS, THIS DESIRE FOR "JOINT STEPS" SEEMED ALREADY EXPRESSED.

7. ON OTHER MATTERS, ECEVIT SAID HE APPRECIATED THE POSITIVE
EVALUATION GIVEN BY SECRETARY VANCE AND OTHERS IN WASHINGTON
TO THE POLITICAL DOCUMENT HE SIGNED IN MOSCOW. HE PLAYED
DOWN ITS SIGNIFICANCE AND THE DIFFICULTIES, REPORTED ELSEWHERE
(REFTEL B), ENCOUNTERED IN NEGOTIATING IT. HE ACKNOWLEDGED
THAT THE CONTINUING NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING READJUSTMENT OF THE
BLACK SEA FIR INVOLVED COMPLICATED QUESTIONS, BUT EXPRESSED
CONFIDENCE THAT, FOLLOWING KOSYGIN'S PERSONAL INTERVENTION,
IT WOULD BE SETTLED TO TURKEY'S SATISFACTION.

8. ECEVIT INDICATED THAT PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT AGREE-
MENT SIGNED IN MOSCOW WAS THAT ON COMMERCIAL RELATIONS.
IT WAS TURKEY'S FIRST LONG-TERM COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT WITH
ANOTHER COUNTRY AND HE HOPED THAT IT WOULD PROVE TO BE A
SPUR TO TURKISH EXPORTS IN BOTH AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY. HE
SAID THE STRUCTURE OF THE TWO ECONOMIES WERE IN SOME RESPECTS
COMPLEMENTARY. THE SOVIETS HAVE A WELL DEVELOPED HEAVY
INDUSTRY BUT HAVE NEGLECTED CONSUMER GOODS WHICH, FOR
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VARIOUS REASONS, THEY CANNOT IMPORT IN ADEQUATE QUANTITIES
FROM WESTERN EUROPE. HE THOUGHT TURKEY HAD NOW FOUND A
MARKET FOR ITS "RATHER HIGHLY DEVELOPED CONSUMER GOODS
INDUSTRY" AS WELL AS FOR SOME OF ITS AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS,
INCLUDING MEAT.

9. COMMENT: ECEVIT OBVIOUSLY BELIEVES THAT HIS VISIT

CONSTITUTED A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO EFFORTS TO OVERCOME
THE PRESENT DIFFICULTIES IN EAST-WEST COMMUNICATION. HE
TAKES CONSIDERABLE PERSONAL SATISFACTION THAT HE WAS RECEIVED
IN MOSCOW AS A RESPONSIBLE MEMBER OF THE NATO ALLIANCE,
RATHER THAN AS THE LEADER OF AN ISOLATED DEVELOPING COUNTRY.
I TOLD HIM I THOUGHT HE HAD DEALT MASTERFULLY WITH THE DELICATE
ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP, DESPITE THE
OBVIOUS PRESSURES EXERTED ON HIM BECAUSE OF TURKEY'S PRESENT
ANOMALOUS POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE US. I KNOW THAT HE WOULD
VERY MUCH APPRECIATE HEARING FROM THE PRESIDENT ALONG SIMILAR
LINES, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE TURKS SUSPECT THAT, IN GENERAL,
WE DO NOT TAKE SERIOUSLY THEIR POLITICAL VIEWS. SPIERS

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